The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(g) by Rodrigues, Usha
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2015
The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(g)
Usha Rodrigues
University of Georgia School of Law, rodrig@uga.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Usha Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(g) , 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1529 (2015),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1024
THE ONCE AND FUTURE
IRRELEVANCY OF SECTION 12(G)
Usha R. Rodrigues*
Among more fundamental reforms, the JOBS Act of 2012
amended Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act and sought to
increase the number of shareholders (from 500 to 2000) that a firm
must have before it must make public disclosures. Argument on the
floor of Congress focused on the undue burden the provision placed
on companies. This Article examines data that invalidates those anec-
dotal concerns.
Indeed, the data reveal important insights: First, my hand-
collected dataset shows that, contrary to public concerns about Sec-
tion 12(g)'s onerous burdens, it only affects a few firms- (less than
three percent of those going public). Second, my research relates to
questions of the relative merits of Congress and the SEC with respect
to fact-finding and the risk of capture. Finally, the Article answers the
critical question the JOBS Act obscured: when, if ever, should we
force private firms public?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRO D U CTIO N .................................................................................. 1530
II. THE HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF SECTION 12(G) ......................... 1531
A . The Origins of Section 12(g) ..................................................... 1532
B. Salient Section 12(g) Victim s ..................................................... 1536
III. DEBATE ON THE CONGRESSIONAL FLOOR .................................... 1540
IV. THE DATA BEHIND THE DEBATE ................................................... 1543
A . M ethodology ............................................................................... 1544
B . R esults ......................................................................................... 1546
V . L E SSO N S .............................................................................................. 1550
A. Finding the Superior Fact-Finder ............................................. 1550
B. Agency Capture v. Public Choice ............................................. 1552
* Associate Dean & M.E. Kilpatrick Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I
thank Mehrsa Baradaran, Dan Coenen, Lori Ringhand, Peter B. Rutledge, Margaret V. Sachs, partici-
pants at the 2013 Law and Entrepreneurship Retreat, the Transactional Law Workshop, and the
Washington University Law School Faculty Workshop. Miranda Owens, Thomas Powell, Robert
Rentz, and Nicola Marie Rossi provided valuable research assistance. Mistakes are my own.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
C. The Unasked Question: Should We Ever Force Private
Companies To Make Public Filings? ....................................... 1554
1. The Coming Proliferation of the Large Private Firm ...... 1554
2. A Missed Opportunity for a Real Debate ......................... 1556
3. A lternatives .......................................................................... 1557
a. Eliminate Forced Public Disclosure ....................... 1557
b. Look Through to Beneficial Holders ...................... 1559
c. Use a Simple Size Test .............................................. 1560
d. Mandate Public Disclosure for Widely Traded
F irm s ........................................................................... 1561
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act ("Exchange Act")
forces a certain class of private firms-until recently, those that had over
500 shareholders of record -into the limelight of public disclosure, effec-
tively forcing them to go public unwillingly (the "500-shareholder rule").1
Conventional wisdom has it that the old 500-shareholder threshold trig-
gered the initial public offerings ("IPO"s) of Apple, Google, and
Facebook.2 Congress responded to the plight of such reluctant public
firms in the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups ("JOBS") Act by rais-
ing the threshold to 2000 shareholders and providing that many employ-
ee shareholders not be counted.'
This Article looks past the largely anecdotal debate on the floors of
Congress by examining data on the number of shareholders firms have
when they actually do go public. With respect to the shareholder thresh-
old itself, I find that Section 12(g) probably forced very few firms public:
between 2000 and the JOBS Act's passage, only 2.94% of firms (35 out
of 1192) went public with over 400 shareholders.4 To be precise, only
2.94% of companies may have been forced public by the rule. Keeping in
mind that firms with more shareholders have more voices clamoring for
liquidity, it is uncertain that even these firms went public because of
Section 12(g), merely that they may have. Thus, examples like Google
and Facebook may be salient, but they are outliers.
1. To be precise, firms with assets over $10 million and a class of equity security held by five
hundred or more persons had to register under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964) (amended 2012). Section 12(g)(1) of the Exchange Act in
reality specifies a $1 million cutoff, but Rule 12g-1 of the Exchange Act exempts firms with $10 million
or less in total assets. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2013). Registering under the Exchange Act means
that a firm must file a Form 10 with the SEC describing its business in detail. Once registered, a firm
must make periodic filings and comply with proxy regulations. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Question-
ing the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REV. ONLINE 43,43 (2011).
2. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
3. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306,325.
Additionally, it exempted crowdfunding investors from the cap and provided a lower cap for unac-
credited investors. Id. at 315.
4. See infra Part IV.B.
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The case study of Section 12(g) reform presented by this Article of-
fers several basic lessons-the first one dealing with the relative virtues
of administrative and legislative action. These events.raise crucial policy
questions about where to draw the line between public and private firms.
A logical choice, and one in keeping with the original intent behind the
1964 amendments that introduced Section 12(g),5 might have imposed
disclosure on firms that, though private, are actively traded. Indeed, Pro-
fessor John Coffee made this suggestion, echoed by widely-respected se-
curities scholar Professor Jay Ritter.6 Such a line would protect the hiring
and capital-raising interests of one firm that lobbied for increasing the
threshold-Wawa-and other traditional widely-held companies, but it
would not have worked with the model of SecondMarket, another
would-be reformer which provided a venue for the active trading of pri-
vate company shares.7 SecondMarket's engagement with reforming Sec-
tion 12(g)8 may explain why the public float suggestion went nowhere.
Part I of this Article outlines the legislative history and original
purpose of Section 12(g), stressing that the legislation was the product of
a meaningful and data-informed debate, and that its goal was to capture
firms already being publicly traded over the counter. It then documents
how subsequent rulemaking rendered the original purpose obsolete, and
how Section 12(g) thus evolved to become a trap for unlucky widely-held
private firms like Facebook. Part II describes the debate on the congres-
sional floor, where argument by anecdote prevailed. Part III provides
some data that cast doubt on the existence of a problem at all. Finally,
Part IV offers lessons from the data.
II. THE HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF SECTION 12(G)
U.S. securities law drags some companies into the public markets
against their will.9 Or it used to. Up until April 5, 2012, Section 12(g) of
the Exchange Act required that firms with assets of over $10 million, and
a class of securities held by over 499 shareholders of record, register their
securities under the Exchange Act.'" Although not originally intended to
ensnare companies not publicly traded, over time (and especially with
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. Testimony of Jay R. Ritter before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th
Cong. 10 (2012) (statement of Jay R. Ritter, Cordell Professor of Finance, Warrington College of
Business Administration, University of Florida).
7. Under the SecondMarket model, investors purchased private company shares from earlier
investors or employees looking to sell. See Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, 81
FORDHAM L. REv. 3389, 3392 (2013).
8. The Private Company Burden: Solutions for Entrepreneurs, Job Creation and Innovation:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 112 Cong. 9-10 (2011) (written testi-
mony of Barry E. Silbert, Founder & CEO, SecondMarket).
9. Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 43 ("Today, the practical effect of this rule is to force certain types
of firms into the public markets earlier than is desirable.").
10. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE EXCHANGE ACT RULE
12G5-1 AND SUBSECTION (B)(3), 1 n.3 (2012) [hereinafter SEC REPORT ON RULE 12G5-1 AND (B)(3)],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/authority-to-enforce-rule-12g5-1.pdf.
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the rise of the practice of granting employees stock options), some pri-
vate firms approached the 500-shareholder threshold and went public
because, in effect, they had to: registration under the Exchange Act sub-
jects private companies to the same periodic reporting that public com-
panies undertake, so most conclude that they "might as well" go public
so as to reap the benefits of an IPO. 1
Forcing public status on a company marks an "extraordinarily sig-
nificant change in its legal obligations and freedom to maneuver. "12 Reg-
istration under the 1934 Act means that companies must file quarterly
reports, an annual report, and periodic updates on Form 8-K when cer-
tain material events occur. 3 They must follow detailed regulations gov-
erning proxy solicitation.1 4 Officers and other insiders face more ready
exposure of possible violations of insider trading and short swing profit
rules.5 Being public increases the stress of running an organization. Mis-
takes are scrutinized not only by analysts, short sellers, and the market in
general, but also by plaintiffs' attorneys. 6 The idea of forcing an unwill-
ing company public is thus "ideologically charged."' 7
A. The Origins of Section 12(g)
There are two key points to take away from the history of Section
12(g). First, it was originally the product of a significant and meaningful
debate. 8 The regulatory reformers had the benefit of several studies on
their side, and those resisting regulation argued that specific thresholds
would overburden both firms and the SEC. 9 Second, the legislation's
original purpose was to impose disclosure on firms that were already
trading over the counter ("OTC")-and thus where, as a practical mat-
ter, a public market already existed.20
11. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 43-44 (arguing that Facebook probably would go public since
it was nearing the 500 holders of record threshold that requires it to "file public company reports re-
gardless" and that Google did go public because it reached the 500 holders of record threshold).
12. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities
Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO L.J. 337,338 (2013).
13. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012).
16. See William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going
Private", 55 EMORY L.J. 141,147 (2006) ("Litigation costs will rise with rising disclosure costs....").
17. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 12.
18. See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the
Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151,166 (2013) (tracing suggestions
similar to the 1964 Securities Act Amendments back to 1938).
19. Id. at 166-68.
20. See Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-
Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 219-22 (2007); Richard M. Phillips & Morgan Shipman, An
Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706, 706 (1964) ("The main fea-
ture of this portion is an extension of the registration, periodic reporting, proxy and insider trading
provisions of sections 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the Exchange Act to larger over-the-counter companies.
These provisions were formerly applicable only to listed companies.").
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The original 1964 amendments were the product of empirical inves-
tigation and debate on the merits.2t From 1955 onward, the operators of
the national exchanges agitated for the government to impose compara-
ble disclosure requirements on stocks traded over the counter. 21 In 1955,
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee conducted a study on the
subject.13
The SEC commissioned a second 120-page report in 1963 that, tak-
ing as a given the need for extending reporting requirements to the OTC
market, focused on the appropriate contours of investor protection.
24 If
investor protection were the only goal driving the SEC, it could have ap-
plied the Exchange Act provisions to all OTC issuers, but it was also
mindful of the burden these expanded requirements would have placed
not only on the issuers but on the agency itself.25 Thus, where to draw the
line became a key question.26
The SEC Report recommended extending reporting requirements
to issuers with over 300 shareholders of record.21 Industry representatives
pushed back, with the Investment Bankers Association proposing a cut-
off for filings of 1000 shareholders.2 8 In response, the SEC pointed out
that this high threshold would "deprive investors in some 1,400 compa-
nies" of its proposed protections.29 It also noted that these companies
were substantial in size, and that many of them made use of notoriously
bad proxy practices.0
The study looked at several possible reporting benchmarks aside
from the number of shareholders, including "transfers of stock, concen-
tration of holdings, and trading interest in interdealer markets."'" The
SEC felt that because "it [was] difficult to conceive of any direct test [of
market activity] that could ever be meaningful and workable," the num-
ber-of-shareholder litmus offered the most viable substitute, even though
it provided only a "rough, indirect measure of activity. 32 It observed that
the number of shareholders encompassed the "number of transfers"
21. See Guttentag, supra note 18, at 166-68.
22. Id. at 166 ("Those who ran the national exchanges were clearly dissatisfied with the disparate
regulatory treatment that depended solely upon where a firm's securities were traded.").
23. See generally SEN. REP. No. 84-376 (1955).
24. H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, pt. 1, at 2-3 (1963).
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id.
28. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N., SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 88-
95, pt. 3 (1964) [hereinafter SEC REPORT], reprinted in 1 SECURITIES ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1964, at
78 (1964) (Statement of Mr. Hudson B. Lemkau, Board of Governors of the National Association of
Securities Dealers).
29. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission with Respect to Modifications of
S. 1642 Proposed by the Investment Bankers Association of America, reprinted in 1 SECURITIES ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1964, at 282 (1964).
30. Id. at 283.
31. SEC REPORT, supra note 28, at 18.
32. Id. at 34 ("In theory, a criterion expressed in terms of market activity might be appealing, but
it is difficult to conceive of any direct test that could ever be meaningful and workable in practice and
it has been seen that the shareholder criterion itself is at least a rough, indirect measure of activity.").
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criteria, as "comparison of numbers of record shareholders with numbers
of record transfers revealed a general correspondence between the
two."33 As to the amount of a company's assets, the study determined
there was "no discernible shareholder-to-assets pattern," which, in com-
bination with the philosophy that the smallest companies were the ones
for which reporting requirements were most needed, led it to initially be
left out of the SEC's recommendations.34 The final amendments reflected
a compromise of 500 shareholders,35 with the additional qualification that
the Act would apply only to companies with over $1 million worth of as-
sets.36 Ultimately, the SEC concluded that the "[n]umber of shareholders
has always been recognized, and obviously is, the most direct and simple
criterion of public-investor interest." 37
The origins of Section 12(g) make clear that Congress never intend-
ed for the provision to have the effect of forcing illiquid private compa-
nies into making public disclosures.38 The 1964 amendments dealt with a
completely separate issue: bringing securities that were already trading
over the counter within the purview of SEC reporting requirements,39
thus providing investor protection to OTC investors "comparable" to
that of exchange investors.' This intervention was needed because, at the
time, an active secondary market existed over the counter. Indeed, the
estimated dollar volume of OTC securities in 1963 had grown to sixty-
one percent of the national security exchanges. 41 Going further, Congress
reasoned, would have been too burdensome, and it deemed 500 a good
compromise number that encompassed most of the OTC market, since
requiring universal reporting of OTC-traded securities would have been
too burdensome on firms with the most thinly traded OTC stocks and al-
so would have threatened to overwhelm the SEC's regulatory staff.42
33. Id. at 20; see LOUIS Loss AND JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 1757 n.1.
34. SEC REPORT, supra note 28, at 26. Though an asset-based criterion was ultimately included
in the bill, its inclusion was for pure cost-benefit reasons, for "defining a limit where burdens may be
disproportionate to needs." Id. at 18.
35. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 2, 78 Stat. 565, 567 (1964)
(amended 2012).
36. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission With Respect to Changes in H.R.
6789 Between Its Submission to the Industry Liaison Committee and Its Introduction to Congress,
Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 566-67 (1964), reprinted in 1 SECURITIES ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1964
(1964) ("The $1 million asset test was evolved by the Commission, primarily in the belief that in the
case of companies having less than $1 million of assets the expense to the issuer and the administrative
burden upon the Commission would outweigh the benefits to stockholders which would result.").
37. Id.
38. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 44-45 (highlighting that the 1964 amendments were targeted at
issuers with sufficiently liquid shares).
39. H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 1 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3013-14. The origi-
nal 1934 Act applied only to securities traded on the national exchanges apparently because "too little
was known about the over-the-counter market in 1934 to enable Congress feasibly to devise provisions
as specific as those relating to listed securities." SEC REPORT, supra note 28, at pt. 3.
40. S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 68 (1934).
41. S. REP. NO. 88-379, at 14 (1963).
42. See Michael Greenstone et al., Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities
Acts Amendments, Q. J. ECON., May 2006, at 411 & n.9.
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This history indicates that robust debate and empirical research sur-
rounded the enactment of Section 12(g) in 1964. Congress thought hard
about the number of shareholders and the size of the asset test that
would serve the public interest in investor protection without being too
burdensome both for the agency and for the firms themselves. The SEC
was deeply involved along the way, including by generating the critical
initial proposal after conducting an in-depth study of the issue.
Another key takeaway from this history is that the 500 number was
intended as a compromise in an effort to capture the appropriate catego-
ry of companies already publicly traded over the counter. Primary sup-
porters of the legislation were the national exchanges that were already
subject to disclosure requirements,43 who viewed the OTC markets as
competitors operating unfairly free of regulation. Indeed, the SEC later
noted that "the registration requirement of Section 12(g) was aimed at
issuers that had 'sufficiently active trading markets and public interest
and consequently were in need of mandatory disclosure to ensure the
protection of investors."'"
Once technology drove down monitoring and compliance costs, this
sort of rough compromise was no longer necessary. On January 4, 1999,
the SEC promulgated rules requiring all domestic OTC Bulletin Board
("OTCBB") firms to comply with the 1934 Act's reporting requirements
by June 2000.41 From that time forward, all firms save traded on the Pink
Sheets were subject to reporting requirements. Today all other firms
traded over the counter are now subject to reporting requirements of
some kind. This development reflects the logical culmination of the orig-
inal impetus behind the 1964 Act reforms: by 1999, technology had ad-
vanced to a point where the law could require almost all publicly traded
firms to make periodic disclosures. This move rendered the original in-
tent of the 500-shareholder threshold moot: now all actively traded firms
had to make periodic disclosures. 46 As a result, the sole effect of the 500-
shareholder threshold became to force unwilling private companies,
43. See Guttentag, supra note 18, at 166 (discussing a 1938 NYSE suggested amendment requir-
ing mandatory disclosure under the Exchange Act).
44. Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 23,407, 1986 WL 703825 at *2 (July 8,
1986).
45. Press Release, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, NASD Announces SEC Approval
of OTC Bulletin Board Eligibility Rule, (Jan. 6, 1999), available at http://www.finra.
org/NewsroomNewsReleases/1999/P010106; see also Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic
Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. Acr. &
ECON. 233, 234-35 (2005). More accurately, to trade on the OTCBB one must be a 1934 Act reporting
company or report to a banking or insurance regulator. OCTBB Frequently Asked Questions: Eligibil-
ity Requirements, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/lndustry/CompliancelMarketTransparency/OTCBB/
FAQ/#300 (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) ("Domestic issues quoted on the OTCBB are limited to the fol-
lowing securities: securities of issuers that make current filings pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('Act') .... "). Firms trading on the Pink Sheets do not need to be
reporting companies. Our Three Tiered Marketplaces, OTCMARKETS, http://www.otcmarkets.
com/learnlotc-market-tiers (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) ("The Open Marketplace").
46. Bushee & Leuz, supra note 45, at 234-35. Or, if a bank or bank holding company, they must
be current in their reports to the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (2012).
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whose shares were widely held but not traded over the counter, into the
public realm.47
At first, it seemed that Section 12(g) would subside into irrelevance
after 1999. Yet over time, as private companies stayed private longer,
and employee stock option plans and multiple rounds of investment in-
creased the number of many private firms' shareholders, even some
companies that never traded over the counter bumped up against the
500-shareholder threshold. s The result was that firms that Congress nev-
er intended to capture with the 1964 amendments were nevertheless
swept into its net. Indeed, following the SEC's 1999 rulemaking, these
became the only companies where Section 12(g) continued to bite.
B. Salient Section 12(g) Victims
The most salient recent examples of private companies being
"forced" to go public are Facebook and Google 9.4  Like Apple before
them, 0 each was a huge private company that seemed content to stay
private. Section 12(g), however, left these firms no option because at the
time it required companies with more than 500 shareholders to register
and become reporting companies.5' Because these firms were compelled
to make periodic disclosures under the Exchange Act already, each de-
cided to register under the 1933 Securities Act and complete an IPO.
This Section will provide a brief summary of the effect of Section 12(g)
on each.
In 2004, Google was a successful private company. 2 Profitable near-
ly from day one, it was able to finance its operations, growth, and acquisi-
tions without recourse to the public markets.13 But, because of "an ob-
scure provision of securities law," as the New York Times termed Section
12(g),54 Google would have been forced to make filings under the
47. See Bushee & Leuz, supra note 45, at 235 ("By eliminating the possibility to trade on the
OTCBB without filing, the eligibility rule essentially forces these firms to choose their next-best alter-
native."); Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 43 ("Today, the practical effect of this rule is to force certain types
of firms into the public markets earlier than is desirable.").
48. Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 45.
49. See also Nicholas Carlson, Why The SEC Will Force Facebook To Go Public, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Jan. 4, 2011, 11:34 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ why-the-sec-will-force-facebook-
to-go-public-2011-1 (explaining the special circumstances underlying SEC investigation); Danny Sulli-
van, Facebook to IPO in 2008 (It'll Have To), SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Oct. 26, 2007, 2:03 PM),
http://searchengineland.com/facebook-to-ipo-in-2008-itll-have-to-12547 (quoting reports that Ex-
change Act requirements forced Google's offering).
50. Apple Computer Plans Initial Public Offering Of Common This Year, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19,




51. See supra notes 46-49.
52. John Markoff, Google Flirts; Investors Wonder About Date, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/24/business/google-flirts-investors-wonder-about-date.html.
53. See Chris Gaither, A Google IPO could be a headache, BALT. SUN, Apr. 27, 2004,
http://articles.baltimoresun.conm/2004-04-27/business/0404270245-1-google-search-ipo.
54. Markoff, supra note 52.
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Exchange Act because it stood on the brink of surpassing the 500-
shareholder limit.5 Thus, it made sense to file for an IPO, 6 which wound
up netting $2.7 billion, giving it the third highest market capitalization in
the Internet sector at the time.17 Without the impetus of Section 12(g),
this tech behemoth may have remained private for longer, perhaps much
longer. Indeed, shortly after the Google IPO, the SEC issued a rule stat-
ing that it would no longer count optionholders in its shareholder census,
but only consider employees as shareholders once their stock actually
vested and was purchased." No longer would companies be forced to go
public simply because they issued too many options, so long as those op-
tions remained unexercised.
Following issuance of the SEC's new options rule, Section 12(g) af-
fected only private companies that (1) issued a significant number of op-
tions, and (2) operated long enough for those options to vest and for the
underlying shares to be bought by employees.59 In theory, these would
not be many firms. Take, as an example, the prototypical technology
startup, which relies heavily on options. The ideal for most startups is to
grow the company towards one of two liquidity events: an IPO or an ac-
quisition.60 If the IPO window is open or acquisitions are common, then
Section 12(g) does not pose much of a problem. But when paths to li-
quidity are less easy, or if a company does not desire such an exit, it be-
comes increasingly possible that a firm might get caught in the 500-
shareholder rule's net.6
Facebook is the most salient example of this type of company. As
with Google, revenue from advertising sales had funded Facebook's op-
erations for many years. 62 But Facebook had "too many shareholders": it
had been private for eight years, and as employee optionholders became
stockholders, it was bumping up against the 500-shareholder threshold. 63
55. See id. (noting that speculation about Google's plan to go public was because the company
had widely distributed stock options to employees, presumably putting it near the 500 mark). Indeed,
it had already passed the 500 shareholder mark by December 31, 2003. See William K. Sjostrom, Ques-
tioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 43, 44 (2011), available at http://www.
hblr.org/2011/03/questioning-the-500-equity-holders-trigger/.
56. Gaither, supra note 53.
57. Cynthia L. Webb, Google's IPO: Grate Expectations, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2004, 9:43 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14939-2004Aug19.html.
58. Exemption of Compensatory Employee Stock Options From Registration Under Section
12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56887 (Dec. 3, 2007).
59. Id. at 69563.
60. See Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga Clawback: Shoring up the Central Pillar of Innovation, 53
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 602-03 (2013) (stating that an IPO or acquisition of a successful startup is
the "much hoped for liquidity event" that allows founders to actually realize the gains of their suc-
cess).
61. See id. at 624-25 (discussing how private companies who issued options to employees may be
forced to make disclosures under Section 12(g) when these options are exercised).
62. Palash Ghosh, Facebook's Postponed IPO: A Wise and Patient Strategy, INT'L BUS. TIMES
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2011, 9:45 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/facebooks-postponed-ipo-wise-patient-
strategy-211547.
63. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Facebook May Be Forced To Go Public amid Market Gloom,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 29, 2011, 7:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/facebook-
may-be-forced-to-go-public-amid-market-gloom/?_r=0.
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Facebook's IPO did not fare as well as Google's, but for our purposes the
crucial point is that Section 12(g) impelled the company to go public be-
fore it would otherwise have done so-at least according to popular
accounts.61
Significantly, outside of the traditional slow-to-IPO firm, Section
12(g) directly threatened two firms offering a new type of trading plat-
form. SecondMarket65 and SharesPost, 66 both of which debuted in 2009,67
began providing a market for the secondary trading of private shares. 68
Others, including myself, have already written extensively about this
market; 69 for the purposes of this Article, I need to highlight only a few
crucial features of these firms.
First, these platforms provided a new venue in which interested par-
ties could buy and sell shares of private companies in a way that was im-
possible before. Secondary markets in private equity predated Second-
Market and SharesPost, but they were largely ad hoc.7" Interested buyers
found it difficult to identify willing sellers, and vice versa." Moreover,
each buyer had to conduct her own research, without the benefit of in-
formation on prior sales or any semblance of a market price.72 Second-
Market and SharesPost made these transactions faster, cheaper, easier,
and more visible.
Second, the market could be a robust one: pre-IPO auctions for Fa-
cebook moved as much as 100,000 shares in a day.73 After Facebook's
IPO, this market stalled, but it has shown new signs of life.74 On March 5,
64. Id.
65. SECONDMARKET, https://www.secondmarket.ccm (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
66. SHARESPOST, https://www.sharespost.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
67. Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3402 (2013).
68. Id. At the time of the JOBS Act's passage, two companies, SecondMarket and SharesPost,
dominated the market, although some competitors have since emerged. Id.; see also Tom Johansmey-
er, CROWDED: SecondMarket, SharesPost Get Yet Another Competitor, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 20,
2011, 11:24 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/crowded-secondmarket-sharespost-get-yet-another-
competitor-2011-12 ("Knight Capital Group, the electronic trading firm, is joining the likes
of SecondMarket and SharesPost -and GFI Group and Liquidnet and Cantor Fitzgerald.").
69. See, e.g., Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C.
L. REV. 745 (2013); Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179
(2012); Rodrigues, supra note 67.
70. See Joe Light, Facebook's Early Buyers Burned, Too, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2012, 9:42 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303506404577448651877204794 ("Secondary
markets have existed for years, with behind-the-scenes brokers hooking up buyers and sellers.
[SharesPost and SecondMarket attempt] to provide more transparency to private transactions and a
more uniform process of buying and selling.").
71. Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21 (2012).
72. Id.
73. Tom Johansmeyer, Volume Increases in Facebook on SharesPost, Valuation Steady, Bus.
INSIDER (July 21, 2011, 7:35 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/volume-increases-in-facebook-on-
sharespost-valuation-steady-2011-7; see also Evelyn M. Rusli & Peter Lattman, Losing a Goose That
Laid the Golden Egg, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 2, 2012, 9:26 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2012/02/02/losing-the-goose-that-laid-the-golden-egg/ (describing that SharesPost's facilitated
$625 million in transactions in 2011, and SecondMarket almost $600 million, with Facebook constitut-
ing about a third of that volume).
74. See Rusli & Lattman, supra note 73 (highlighting, for example, that Facebook's "trades
[made] up the bulk" of SecondMarket's transactions).
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2014, SharesPost and NASDAQ OMX launched a joint venture called
the NASDAQ PrivateMarket, LLC.75 SecondMarket facilitated over for-
ty transactions of more than $10 million in 2013, allowing employees and
early investors to sell their shares.76
Third, firms whose shares traded on the secondary market increas-
ingly risked bumping up against the 500-shareholder threshold. Employ-
ees or ex-employees made up most of the seller population. 77 Often they
sold only a portion of their shares.78 An employee might, for example,
sell half of her vested options in order to finance a new house but keep
the rest in order to benefit from a hoped-for increase in share price in a
later IPO. Founders and existing venture capitalists likewise used these
secondary markets to obtain a modicum of liquidity, without fully exiting
their investment.79 Thus, each sale-rather than substituting new share-
holders for old-added to the growing shareholder-of-record tally. It was
therefore vital to SecondMarket's business model that the 500 number be
lifted. And, as I detail in a separate article, SecondMarket spent $380,000
on lobbying for Section 12(g), while its employees made significant cam-
paign contributions to supporters of reform.80
Finally, these markets are not open to the general public. Buyers
are required to be accredited investors8 -those with over $200,000 in in-
come or $1 million in assets.8 Because these transactions took place not
on a public exchange like the NYSE, but instead in a private market lim-
ited to accredited investors, they could transpire outside the reach of the
SEC's 1999 rule on OTC trading.83 No disclosure necessary.
75. Press Release, NASDAQ Private Market, NASDAQ Private Market Launches New Mar-
ketplace for Private Companies (Mar. 5, 2014), available at http://globenewswire.com/news-
release/2014/03/05/615856/10071210/enNASDAQ-Private-Market-Launches-New-Marketplace-for-
Private-Companies.html.
76. Yuliya Chernova, Startup Employees Cash In Stock Options Early, WALL ST. J.: THE
ACCELERATORS (Feb. 3, 2014, 12:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/2014/02/03/startup-
employees-cash-in-stock-options-early.
77. Kim-Mai Cutler, Employees Made Up Nearly Two-Thirds of Private Stock Sellers on Se-
condMarket Last Year, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 30, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/30/eniployees-
made-up-nearly-two-thirds-of-private-stock-sellers-on-secondmarket-last-year/.
78. See Rodrigues, supra note 67, at 3411 (discussing one advantage of SecondMarket was that it
allowed employees to sell portions of their shares); Chernova, supra note 76 ("Now, many large
startups are offering employees a chance to sell a portion of their stake, at the same time as continuing
to hold onto the rest.").
79. See Rodrigues, supra note 67, at 3405 (stating the approximately four percent of sellers are
investors or founders-a percentage that was increasing over time).
80. See infra note 127.
81. Barry Silbert, Not All Markets Are Created Equal, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/28/secondmarket-sec/ ("Only 'accredited' investors are eligible to buy
private company stock on SecondMarket, and we have established a process to ensure that only ac-
credited investors buy stock.").
82. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (2013).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 200.2(b) (1999).
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III. DEBATE ON THE CONGRESSIONAL FLOOR
A small constellation of bills converged to create what would be-
come the JOBS Act of 2012. Title V, the main shareholder-of-record
provision, began as the Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act
("PCFG Act"), introduced in June 2011 by Representative David
Schweikert of Arizona.4 It not only sought to raise the Section 12(g)
threshold from 500 to 1000, but also to exclude from the definition of
holders of record both accredited investors and employee compensation
plans."
The storyline of the reform camp was clear: the 500-shareholder
rule discouraged growth-and by extension, job creation-by impeding
hiring and capital-raising. A group of Silicon Valley CEOs and investors
presented a letter to Congress offering a classic statement of the argu-
ment: "The 500 Shareholder Rule is outdated, overly restrictive, and lim-
its U.S. job creation and American global competitiveness."86 The writers
made two arguments about why Section 12(g)'s threshold should be in-
creased. First, stock options are a valuable employee-motivational tool,
and as companies take longer to go public, options vest and employees
exercise them, creating more and more private-firm shareholders. "Thus,
the 500 Shareholder Rule has created a disincentive for private compa-
nies to hire and/or provide equity-based compensation to new employ-
ees." 7 Second, the letter reasoned that the rule constrained private com-
panies' financing decisions: given only 500 total "slots" for both
employees and investors, firms were forced to "[limit] the pool of poten-
tial individual and institutional investors." 88 In essence, the letter argued,
the 500-shareholder rule forces firms to choose between forgoing hiring
(at least with the use of stock options) or forgoing funding. Contempo-
rary commentary echoed this concern: one technology journalist called
the 500-shareholder rule "one of the Valley's biggest pain points,"8 9 argu-
ing that entrepreneurs know best when it comes to the relative merits of
public versus private: "[m]ost entrepreneurs believe private companies
can move quicker and innovate faster, so forcing someone to go public
because of an arbitrary rule that pre-dated modern practices like grant-
ing stock options seems absurd." 9
84. Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, H.R. 2167, 112th Cong. (2011).
85. H.R. 2167 §§ 2-3.
86. Douglas MacMillan & Joshua Gallu, Twitter, Gilt CEOs Fight SEC's 500-Shareholder Rule
for Startups, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Dec. 13, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2011-12-14/twitter-gilt-ceos-fight-sec-s-500-shareholder-limits-on-private-startups.
87. Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and
Inv. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 92 (2011) (statement of Barry
E. Silbert, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, SecondMarket, Inc.).
88. Id. at 93.





No data supported these conclusions; instead, argument by anec-
dote prevailed. One House representative referred to "a company in
Newport, Vermont, that has been under a lot of regulatory pressure.
They can't go over that 500 threshold."9 Montana Senator Tester cited a
seventy-five year old "Montana-grown company" that "has always be-
lieved in rewarding its employees so they can have a stake in the success
of the firm, which now operates in 16 States," but faced the choice of
"costly public registration or potentially eliminating existing employee
shareholders." 2 Senator Toomey of Pennsylvania expressed the concern
in these words:
There are many companies throughout Pennsylvania, across the
country, that are successful. They are thriving, they are growing, but
they have a number of shareholders that is bumping up against their
limit. They are close to 500. They need to raise capital. They do not
want to go public, and they have plenty of people who would like to
invest in their successful business so they can grow. But they cannot
do it because they are so close to the threshold.93
At the same time that the PCFG bill was wending its way along, H.R.
1965-the precursor of Title VI of the JOBS Act-proposed raising the
threshold for banks and bank-holding companies.94 Its proponents
stressed the importance of the community bank: "Community banks are
the life blood of our local economies. These are the banks we need to see
lending to small businesses and homeowners, but they are hamstrung in
their attempt to raise capital by outdated SEC registration requirements.
This one is over half a century old. 95
Reformers also emphasized that this proposal made good sense be-
cause banks are highly regulated, so that revamping disclosure require-
ments would not eliminate investor protections.96 Advocates for raising
the threshold in the bank context emphasized over and over again that
banking was a regulated industry:
Now, it might be asked is this prudent? And the answer to that
question, of course, is that the banks and the bank holding compa-
nies are very heavily regulated by their prudential regulators. From
the moment they are chartered, they are overseen by State and
Federal entities that are designed to keep them from any sort of
fraud from imprudent activities, and so this is an industry that is al-
ready heavily regulated, even for those companies who remain
private .97
91. 158 CONG. REC. H1279 (daily ed. Mar. 8,2012) (remarks of Rep. Welch).
92. 158 CONG. REC. S1886 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (remarks of Sen. Tester).
93. 158 CONG. REC. S1968 (daily ed. Mar. 22,2012) (remarks of Sen. Toomey).
94. H.R. 1965 § 1, 112th Cong. (2011).
95. 157 CONG. REC. H7227 (daily ed. Nov. 2,2011) (remarks of Rep. Hoyer).
96. 157 CONG. REC. H7227 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 2011) (remarks of Rep. Himes) (addressing the
prudence of raising the shareholder-reporting threshold for banks by noting that banks are already
heavily regulated).
97. 157 CONG. REc. H7227 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 2011) (remarks of Rep. Hoyer); see also Legislative
Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hearing on H.R. 2167 Be-
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Thus, two distinct arguments concurrently played out on the Hill.
Advocates for raising the shareholder threshold for banks emphasized
that it was already a highly regulated industry. Advocates for raising the
shareholder threshold for regular firms stressed that the burdensome
regulation stifled growth and hiring.
Contrary voices did signal caution, but they failed to understand the
true impact of Section 12(g). SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar urged that
investor protection would suffer. 8 A push from Senator Jack Reed to
change the method for counting holders from record to beneficial hold-
ers failed. 9 Remarkably, it was premised on a mistaken perception of the
impact on Section 12(g). "Street name" is the practice of brokerages
naming themselves as the record holders of the stock of individual inves-
tors, who remain the beneficial holders."° Originally intended to stream-
line paperwork processing when stocks change hands multiple times in a
month or even a week, the practice of holding in street name means that
a single entity could count as one holder of record despite owning shares
on behalf of hundreds or even thousands of beneficial owners, each of
whom buy and sell the underlying shares.101 Holding in street name
means that the shareholders of record measure drastically undercounts
the number of beneficial-that is, actual-holders of stock.
Yet, Aguilar and his supporters elided a crucial point: hardly any
private company shares are held in street name. 10 There are some nota-
ble private exceptions to the one-beneficial-holder-to-one-shareholder-
of-record rule, but these should be captured by the SEC's anticircumven-
tion rule, Rule 12g5-1(b)(3). 03 In general, in the private company con-
text, a shareholder of record means a beneficial holder.1°4
Misbegotten as the argument about looking through to beneficial
holders was, the pro-regulatory camp used it to gain concessions: most
fore the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th
Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of Rep. James Himes, Member of Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov't
Sponsored Enters.) ("I take some comfort in that; [banks] are much more regulated than most other
commercial entities."); 158 CONG. REC. S1828 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (remarks of Sen. Landrieu).
98. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Regarding Interactive Data
Releases (Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spchl21708laa.htm.
99. See 158 CONG. REC. S1884 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (failing a voice vote).
100. Holding Your Securities-Get the Facts, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.govl
investor/pubs/holdsec.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
101. See REPORT ON AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE EXCHANGE ACT RULE 12g5-1 AND SUBSECTION
(b)(3), U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 7-11 (Oct. 15, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2012/authority-to-enforce-rule-12g5-1.pdf [hereinafter SEC Report on Rule 12g5-1 and (b)(3)].
102. Cf. 158 CONG. REC. H1280 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012) (discussing the widespread use of "street
name" holdings in public companies).
103. The Rule states that "[i]f the issuer knows or has reason to know that the form of holding
securities of record is used primarily to circumvent the provisions of Section 12(g) . . . of the Act, the
beneficial owners of such securities shall be deemed to be the record owners thereof." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g5-1 (2012).
104. In contrast, in the context of publicly traded delisting or going dark, immobilization means
that, as Rep. Capuano put it, "[b]roker-dealers can hold investments on behalf of thousands, an unlim-
ited number of people." 158 CONG. REC. H1280 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012). For public companies, then,
using the shareholder-of-record measure drastically undercounts the number of beneficial holders. But
this is a problem relating to delisting, a topic that was never on the table for the JOBS Act.
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important, the specialized cap of 500 unaccredited investors was inserted
in the legislation, 15 and the Commission would study its anticircumven-
tion powers. °0 We will revisit this compromise again later in our story.
So much for the debate over Section 12(g) on the House and Senate
floors. The policy arguments made in its favor were two-fold: the rule
constrained capital formation and firm hiring. Anecdotes proved the
point, and the parallel move to raise the shareholder threshold in the
banking sector lent legitimacy to the move-even though the main ra-
tionale for raising the threshold in the banking context, that it was a high-
ly regulated industry, did not apply to the rank-and-file firms of Title V.
The bill was swept up in a larger bipartisan, probusiness spate of law-
making. °7
Two distinctive and related features of Section 12(g) make it an un-
usually good candidate for a deeper study of how securities law-and
perhaps law in general-gets made today. The first characteristic of this
lawmaking process is that relevant data were available °8 Indeed, the
SEC was conducting a study, as it emphasized repeatedly while Section
12(g) reforms were hammered out.109 Yet, its research was ultimately
pushed to the side as irrelevant."0
IV. THE DATA BEHIND THE DEBATE
No studies undertook to demonstrate that the challenged 500-total-
shareholder number was in fact problematic. Rather, the centerpiece of
the case for change took the form of anecdotal evidence about compa-
nies from their home states."' No one researched how extensive the
105. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat.
306, 325 (2012).
106. Id. at § 504, 126 Stat. at 326. In an October 15, 2012, report, the Commission concluded that
it had adequate tools to bring a case for violations of 12(g). SEC Report on Rule 12g5-1 and (b)(3),
supra note 101, at 31.
107. Guttentag, supra note 18, at 173.
108. See SEC Report on Rule 12g5-1 and (b)(3), supra note 101, at 3 n.6 (discussing the data re-
viewed to create the SEC's report).
109. See, e.g., Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part
I: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 10, 25, 30, 35 (2011)
[hereinafter Spurring Job Growth] (statement of Meredith Cross, Director, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n);
Crowdfunding: Connecting Investors and Job Creators: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin.
Servs. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 112th
Cong. 91 (2011) (statement of Meredith Cross, Director, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n); Fixing the Watchdog:
Legislative Proposals to Improve and Enhance the Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 22, 37 (2011) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman.,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n); Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job
Creation: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Gov't Sponsored Entities of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 112th Cong. 11, 14-15, 20 (2011) (statement of Meredith Cross, Director, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n).
110. See discussion infra Part IV.
111. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. H1279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012) (statement of Rep. Welch) ("We've
got a company in Newport, Vermont, that has been under a lot of regulatory pressure. They can't go
over that 500 threshold."); 158 CONG. REc. S1886 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Tester)
("For example, changes to the SEC's 500 shareholder rule would ensure companies, such as invest-
ment brokerage D.A. Davidson in Great Falls, can continue to provide their employees with stock in
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problem actually was and whether reform of the 500-shareholder
benchmark would remediate it. Moreover, agency specialists from the
SEC's Corporation Finance Division testified on several occasions that
the agency was working on an empirical report. 12 Division Director
Meredith B. Cross also pointed out that the 1964 reforms had been based
on an extensive SEC report."3 Yet the 2012 legislation proceeded with-
out the benefit of any new data. Concentrating on the reach of Section
12(g), I have gathered here the sort of relevant data Congress did not
consider. In particular, this original dataset focuses on how many firms in
fact found themselves compelled to go public because of the much-
criticized 500-shareholder rule.
A. Methodology
I seek to uncover the effect of Section 12(g) by looking at firms that
have gone public and the number of shareholders they have when they
do so. These data are available because Item 201(b) of Regulation S-K
requires firms to disclose "the approximate number of holders of each
class of common equity ... as of the latest practicable date.""14 And
Section 12(g) requires registration for issuers with "a class of equity secu-
rity (other than an exempted security) held of record by ... 500 [post-
JOBS Act, 2,000] persons.""' 5 To my knowledge, no other scholar has ex-
amined these data before.
The hypothesis to be tested in considering these data is whether
Section 12(g) motivates some firms to go public. It merits emphasis that
this hypothesis is nearly impossible to test conclusively. There are many
reasons why firms may choose to go public as their number of sharehold-
ers grows. To posit but a few, firms with more shareholders may (1) tend
the company without having to go through a costly and time-consuming registration process with the
SEC. This Montana-grown company dates back over 75 years and has always believed in rewarding its
employees so they can have a stake in the success of the firm, which now operates in 16 States. With-
out these changes, a company such as D.A. Davidson would be faced with the choice of costly public
registration or potentially eliminating existing employee shareholders."); 158 CONG. REC. S1968 (daily
ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Toomey) ("There are many companies throughout Pennsylvania,
across the country, that are successful. They are thriving, they are growing, but they have a number of
shareholders that is bumping up against their limit. They are close to 500. They need to raise capital.
They do not want to go public, and they have plenty of people who would like to invest in their suc-
cessful business so they can grow. But they cannot do it because they are so close to the threshold.").
112. See generally Spurring Job Growth, supra note 109 (statement of Meredith Cross, Director,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
113. Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation, supra
note 109, at 69 (statement of Meredith Cross, Director, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n); Spurring Job Growth,
supra note 109, at 10 (statement of Meredith Cross, Director, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 229.201(b) (2013).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2012). Under section 12(g)(5) of the Exchange Act, "class" means "all secu-
rities of an issuer which are of substantially similar character and the holders of which enjoy substan-
tially similar rights and privileges." Id. This means that an issuer could have 499 preferred sharehold-
ers and 499 common shareholders and still avoid registration. Harold S. Blumenthal & Samuel Wolff,
Exchange Act Section 12(g)-Class of Equity Securities, § 7:6 SEC. AND FED. CoRP. L. (2d ed. 2015).
There is little evidence, however, that many firms have attempted to maintain large numbers of both
preferred and common shareholders.
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to be larger, and larger firms may go public at a higher rate than smaller
firms, (2) have more investors agitating for exit, (3) be older companies
with investors who accordingly have lost patience with holding onto illiq-
uid stock, or (4) make bargained-for disclosure more costly, so that
economies of scale make committing to mandatory public disclosure
more attractive. Even so, if very few firms go public with close to 500
shareholders, then we can say with some confidence that Section 12(g) is
not causing firms to go public. If, on the other hand, many firms go public
at close to 500 shareholders, their decision to go public might be because
of Section 12(g). Pure causation can only be determined in the
negative." 6
I examined a sample of firms that went public between June 1, 2000,
and May 16, 2013. A regulatory change dictated the start of the sample
period. In 1999, the SEC approved the NASD's OTC Bulletin Board
Eligibility Rule, which limited OTCBB trading to firms that reported
current financial information to the SEC, banking, or insurance regula-
tors.117 These regulations phased in over the course of eighteen months,
and the new rule applied to all companies as of June 2000.118 1 assume in
the months prior to June 2000 some set of firms that would otherwise
prefer to remain private went public to comply with the new rule. My in-
terest is in comparing the population of firms that go public voluntarily
and those that go public because of the 500-shareholder rule, so I begin
the sample as soon as the rule was fully implemented with respect to the
OTCBB.
I searched the Compustat database "9 for firms with an IPO date
from June 1, 2000, to May 16, 2013, that list a number of common share-
holders, a variable it denominates "cshr.'' 120 Compustat describes the
"cshr" category as representing "the actual number of shareholders of
common/ordinary capital as reported by the company."t 2' Note that
Section 12(g) requires registration when a firm reaches $10 million in as-
sets and "a class of equity security.., held of record by 500 persons"
(now 2000 persons or 500 persons who are not accredited investors).122 I
did not combine preferred and common holders when they were report-
116. To be sure, it is possible that firms with fewer than 400 shareholders might choose to go pub-
lic because they anticipate nearing the 500 threshold at some future time.
117. Bushee & Leuz, supra note 45, at 239; Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., NASD
Announces SEC Approval of OTC Bulletin Bd. Eligibility Rule (Jan. 6, 1999), available at http://
www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/1999/P010106.
118. See Bushee & Leuz, supra note 45, at 240 ("The eligibility rule became immediately effective
for new OTCBB quotations, but provided a phase-in period for issuers with securities quoted as of
January 4, 1999. Each issuer was assigned a phase-in date between July 1999 and June 2000 based on
its ticker symbol as of January 4, 1999.").
119. S&P CAPITAL IQ, http://www.compustat.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
120. Id.
121. Part I1 Data Definitions A-FO, COMPUSTAT (GLOBAL) DATA 156 (Aug. 2, 2002), http://
140.137.101.73:8008/ri/manual/globdata/Part2a.pdf.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2012).
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ed separately, because the statute refers to a "class of equity security. '123
I counted whichever class, preferred or common, had more holders.
Compustat's data for the IPO year is systematically inaccurate with
respect to the initial shareholder numbers. Take, for example, a firm that
goes public in 1998 and reports in its S-1 (the document that it files in or-
der to go public) that it has 200 shareholders of record. After trading for
a year, its 1998 10-K reports that it has 600 common shareholders. Com-
pustat generally reports that the firm had 600 shareholders in 1998. In
other words, it reports the post-IPO number instead of the pre-IPO
number. For this reason, to find accurate data about the pre-IPO share-
holder population, it is necessary to look up each S-1 or prospectus and
locate the shareholder number in that document. With the help of re-
search assistants who individually reviewed each document filed closest
to the IPO date, I gathered these data for the full 2002-2013 period. I
had two research assistants hand-collect these data to check Compustat's
figures."4
B. Results
In the process of collecting this information a few minor complica-
tions arose. In nine instances, I could not locate the firm, and twenty-one
had filed no S-1 (because, for example, they went public via reverse mer-
ger). Twenty-three firms completed their IPO before the period began
(for example, Compustat reported a blank-check company's acquisition
as an IPO). I eliminated 211 more transactions because they did not in-
volve U.S. corporations, thus rendering Section 12(g) inapplicable, in-
cluding firms such as partnerships and other noncorporate entities (sev-
enty-nine), real estate trusts (eighty-nine), and foreign firms (seventy).
Also eliminated were offerings involving thirty-four closed-end invest-
ment companies, nineteen firms that went public by way of an S-4 (for
business combinations, spin-offs, and the like), and one firm that went
public by way of S-1 in conjunction with a merger. Finally, I eliminated
fifty firms as spin-offs, reasoning that spinoffs by definition are not driv-
en by shareholder number.
The result was that 1249 firms remained, of which 1192 went public
before the JOBS Act was passed. See Table I.
123. Id.
124. Post-IPO, Compustat sometimes reports the number of beneficial owners instead of holders
of record, or combines the two figures. This problem is not relevant for this paper. See Part H: Data




Pre-JOBS firms 1 2-50 1-50 51-1(X) 101- 151- 201- 251- 301- 351- 4011. 4514 5()
Number of 15(o 21 250 30 350 400 450
shareholders at
IPO
Number of firms 71 312 383 156 122 79 46 45 20 13 6 25 19
% of firms 7.93% 141A6% 42-79% 17.43% 1363% &83% 5.14% 5.03% 223% 1.45% 0.67% 2.79% Z12%
reporting
(n --895)
% of sample firms 5-96% 26-17% 3066% 13.09% 10.23% 6.63% 3.86% 3.70% 168% 125% 0.48% 2.10% 1-59%
(n = 1192)
The lessons of the data are limited but clear. I choose 400 share-
holders as a cutoff number that I hypothesize will capture most of the
firms that went public because of Section 12(g). The law may of course
have some in terrorem effect even below the 400 shareholder threshold,
but I predict that this effect would be marginal. Despite the rhetoric of
congressmen and SecondMarket, very few firms went public with 400-
500 shareholders-only thirty-one firms, or 2.60% of the sample. In addi-
tion, if one focuses on firms with more than 450 shareholders, the per-
centage drops to 2.10%. Moreover, we cannot say conclusively that
Section 12(g) caused even these firms to go public. As discussed above,
there are other natural reasons why a company with many shareholders
might choose to go public, without regard to the effect of the 500-
shareholder rule.
The data face another limit: they cannot shed light on all of the im-
pacts of Section 12(g). For example, as firms approach the limit they
might curtail stock option grants, restrict capital raising, or engage in
costly maneuvers such as reverse stock splits to avoid the bite of the 500-
shareholder rule. For every firm that the 500-shareholder rule actually
forced into public disclosure, then, there might be five, ten, or one hun-
dred that in another way felt its effect. This limitation is intrinsic to the
data: all they can and do show is that few firms were actually forced pub-
lic-as opposed to adapting while remaining private-by the 500-
shareholder rule.
I break out firms with a sole shareholder because I expected to see a
large number of those. I then include them in the 1-50 category. The da-
ta show that the majority of firms reporting a number of shareholders of
record (60.22%) go public with 100 or fewer shareholders of record. On-
ly 7.15% of firms reporting a number of shareholders of record go public
with over 300 shareholders. Contrary to my expectations, fewer firms
with more shareholders seem to go public than those with fewer share-
holders. See Tables II & III.
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Finally, the data show that some firms might flout the law, either by
disclosing that they had more than 499 shareholders of record at IPO or
by failing to disclose a shareholder-of-record number at all. Notably,
nineteen pre-JOBS firms went public with 500 or more shareholders of
record and did not begin registering under the 1934 Act when the law re-
quired them to do so. Indeed, two of the most prominent companies
thought to have been captured by the reach of Section 12(g) overshot the
threshold by a significant margin. Facebook went public with 1305 Class
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B Common shareholders of record (and 115 Class A), more than twice as
many shareholders as the 1934 Act permitted. 125 Google went public with
1242 Class B Common holders, and 845 Class A Common holders.1 26 The
SEC appeared, at least in these two cases, to allow the firms considerable
leeway in complying with the rule.
Out of the total sample of 1249 firms, 311 (24.90%) failed to dis-
close any number of shareholders of record, despite that figure being re-
quired by law. On one hand, this nondisclosure might not be surprising.
Potential IPO investors likely care far more about a firm's revenue and
business prospects than the number of shareholders it has. Similarly, the
SEC may not place much emphasis on the shareholder-of-record number
in its pre-effective-date reviews of the issuer's registration statements. It
is likely far more concerned that the issuer is not being unduly optimistic
in its assertions and that any numbers and projections it reports are accu-
rate or at least substantiated. On the other hand, it may be that a large
number of these nonreporting firms actually have significantly more than
500 shareholders and are attempting to avoid the embarrassment of an
ongoing violation by omitting to disclose the number. There is no way to
know.
To summarize, this is the story of Section 12(g): It started out to
protect investors from firms trading over the counter without disclosures.
Subsequent rulemaking rendered that function obsolete, so that its sole
function became to force firms public. A concentrated lobby, led in
spending by the one firm that, as a repeat player, was the most threat-
ened by the provision, built an attack on the 500 number into a larger
JOBS Act narrative about freeing firms from pernicious regulation. 27 All
participants ignored publicly available data, which (as this Part reveals)
cast doubt on the existence of the problem as an empirical matter.
With the JOBS Act, the overall shareholder number has now in-
creased to 2000 and excludes those who receive stock from employee
compensation plans.1 2s Although it is true that the limit remains 500 for
unaccredited investors, 29 the data show that few firms approached that
number pre-IPO. Including post-JOBS Act firms, thirty-six out of 1249
went public with over 400 shareholders, or 2.88% of the sample (3.46%
of firms reporting a shareholder number at IPO). Even more important-
ly, the old number counted employee stockholders, 3° while the post-
JOBS Act shareholder-of-record count excludes them. Thus, the post-
125. Facebook, Inc., Amendment No. 7 to Registration Statement (Form S-1) 149 (May 15, 2012),
available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512232582/d287954dsla.htm.
126. Google, Inc., Prospectus 105 (Aug. 18, 2004), available at https:lwww.sec.govlArchives/
edgar/data/1288776/000119312504143377/d424b4.htm#toc5933017.
127. SecondMarket spent $380,000 in lobbying and its employees made significant campaign con-
tributions, as detailed in a separate article. Usha R. Rodrigues, The Price of Corruption, J.L. & POL.
(forthcoming 2015) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/Papers.cfm?abstract-id 2486720.
128. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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JOBS Act Section 12(g) will be unlikely to affect more than a handful of
firms.
V. LESSONS
My research reveals that, despite the conventional wisdom accepted
without question on the Hill, Section 12(g) likely affected very few firms.
Despite the lack of evidence of a problem, Title V of the JOBS Act
changed the shareholder threshold. This Part offers some lessons from
the story of Title V's passage.
A. Finding the Superior Fact-Finder
Common understandings, which are reflected in our law, suggest
that Congress is a good fact-finder-at least in comparison to the judici-
ary. Historically, there has been a good deal of judicial deference to con-
gressional fact-finding, as long as Congress presented sufficient facts."'
What about Congress' fact-finding capabilities relative to adminis-
trative agencies? In 1964, when Congress first adopted Section 12(g), the
SEC was deeply involved in the reform process-so much so that the
SEC's 1963 report formed the basis for the legislation.'32 While it is true
that the SEC initially proposed a cutoff of 300 shareholders, when the
Investment Bankers Association proposed a cutoff of 1000 shareholders,
the SEC was able to look to the data it had collected to argue that this
threshold would deny protection to the shareholders of 1400 compa-
nies.'
In contrast, the SEC was continually playing catch-up in 2012. Dur-
ing the PCFG Act debate, the SEC repeatedly alluded to the fact that it
was in the middle of conducting a study of shareholder numbers.34 As
Part III reveals, the data available would have suggested that the 500-
shareholder threshold affected relatively few firms' decision about going
public. Yet Congress did not wait for that study.
One reason why Congress failed to wait may be that it faced no
penalty for acting with dispatch. In particular, congressional fact-
finding-or the lack of it-has little impact on judicial review of legisla-
tion of this kind. In matters of economic regulation, the judiciary long
has deferred to congressional judgments, including by hypothesizing
plausible rationales for its actions, even when the legislative record sug-
131. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okia., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) ("[lIt is for the legislature,
not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new [law]."). But see, e.g., United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (describing a government concession that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act and its associated legislative history did not contain a finding of facts connecting gun
possession in school zones to interstate commerce).
132. See supra Part II.A.
133. See id.
134. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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gests that Congress was not careful or was misled by self-serving interest
groups.'35
Of particular importance, the unlikely prospect of judicial invalida-
tion of legislation in the securities field contrasts sharply with the reality
of close judicial scrutiny of SEC action. Take, for example, the rigorous
cost-benefit analysis the D.C. Circuit applied in Business Roundtable v.
SEC.'36 In that case, the SEC promulgated and adopted rules on proxy
access, requiring public companies to allow shareholders the ability to
include their nominees on the proxy card that companies send out for
annual shareholder elections. 37 The court found the proxy access rule to
be "arbitrary and capricious" under the APA.138 According to the court,
the SEC "inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and bene-
fits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to ex-
plain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected to support its
predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to sub-
stantial problems raised by commenters."'139
The Business Roundtable court upbraided the SEC repeatedly for
failing to consider relevant factors, including underestimating the intensi-
ty of companies' opposition to the shareholder-nominated candidates,'14
not estimating the costs to companies of campaigning against these can-
didates,' and neglecting costs to companies from the use of proxy access
by special interests like union and government pension funds. 42
Of particular interest, the court took the SEC to task for its selec-
tive use of data that concerned whether the proposed rule would actually
improve board performance. It scolded that, although there were "nu-
merous studies" that found the opposite result, the SEC "completely dis-
counted" those studies14 3-even though, by the court's own account, the
agency discounted the studies "because of questions raised by subse-
quent studies, limitations acknowledged by the studies' authors, or [its]
own concerns about the studies' methodology or scope."'114
Notably, the court leveled these criticisms at the SEC even though it
had, in fact, relied on two empirical studies, one of which (unlike the
studies cited by the court) was published in a respected peer-reviewed
journal. 45 The SEC did acknowledge in footnotes cited by the court that
135. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 397
(showing that filled milk legislation was the product of special interest lobbying); Dan T. Coenen, The
Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible "Semisubstantive" Constitutional Rules, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2835, 2866 (2009) (discussing U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz).
136. 647 F.3d 1144, 1149-51 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
137. Id. at 1147.
138. Id. at 1148.
139. Id. at 1148-49.
140. Id. at 1149.
141. Id. at 1149-50.
142. Id. at 1152.
143. Id. at 1150-51.
144. Id. at 1151 (quoting Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668-01,
56,762-63 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200)).
145. See id. (noting the studies relied upon by the Commission).
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there were limitations to one of its studies, and that some of its implica-
tions on the question at hand were "difficult to interpret."'" Relying in
part on these conclusions, the court dismissed the studies themselves as
"relatively unpersuasive. 147
The lessons of this story are clear, if unappetizing. Because of gov-
erning separation of powers principles, courts defer to congressional fact-
finding to a fundamentally greater extent than they defer to agency ac-
tion. Especially in the case of controversial matters like proxy access, ju-
dicial review can be rigorous -indeed, downright nitpicky. It follows that
the most effective way for a private actor to seek bullet-proof change is
to go straight to Congress.
Judicial deference to congressional fact-finding enables Congress to
make law-particularly obscure securities law-by anecdote rather than
by data. The SEC lacks this capacity. And the result-as illustrated by
the reworking of Section 12(g) in 2012-is that self-interested parties
may rush to the congressional forum, at least when the winds of broad
reform are in the air, to secure targeted legal change that serves their dis-
tinctive interests.
B. Agency Capture v. Public Choice
Representatives and senators strive for reelection, "since legislators
who fail to do so quickly become ex-legislators."'4 Public choice theory
suggests that these legislators are disproportionately likely to favor spe-
cial interest groups, because they are better informed, well-positioned to
influence prospective voters, and inclined to make sizeable campaign
contributions. 149
The story of Section 12(g) exemplifies the operation of these forces.
The driver behind the legislation was really Title I, which aimed to make
it easier for firms to go public.5 " Raising the shareholder threshold was a
footnote in a larger reform agenda. The official reports on the JOBS Act
do not even mention shareholder-reporting thresholds.' Even so, condi-
tions for altering the 500-shareholder threshold were distinctly favorable
in 2012. To be sure, the JOBS Act hit at a moment when bipartisan legis-
lation was almost nonexistent.'52 But the economy was bad, and there was
a strong sense that doing "something" to help would be popular among
voters.'53 The catchily titled JOBS Act was hard to resist, although it had
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 81
(2001).
149. Id.
150. Guttentag, supra note 18, at 173 n.118.
151. Id. at 174 n.119.
152. Jonathan Weisman, Final Approval by House Sends Jobs Bill to President for Signature, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/us/politics/final-approval-by-house-sends-
jobs-bill-to-president-for-signature.html?_r=0.
153. 158 CONG. REC. H1241 (daily ed. Mar. 7,2012) (statement of Rep. Robert Dold).
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nothing to do with jobs, as more than one member of Congress ob-
served."'
The story of the lobbying and campaign contributions behind
Section 12(g)-which I detail in a separate piece-shows how a surgically
targeted reform effort can influence legislation, especially if it acts under
the cover of a larger agenda. This reform effort cost little in terms of
monetary outlays. Total lobbying expenditures were less than $500,000
and campaign contributions were a fraction of that number.155
Section 12(g) also suggests that the risks that special interests pose
may be different with this type of targeted, distributive (as opposed to
redistributive or dedistributive) legislation where there is a narrow class
of beneficiaries and uncertain public cost on the other side. Legislative
change may come relatively cheaply under these conditions because the
opportunities for counterinfluence are remote.
Still, the lack of data analysis in the Section 12 (g) debates suggest
that the risk of agency capture might present the lesser of two evils, at
least when it comes to securities law. In particular, the slow pace of agen-
cy action on the front end greatly complicates efforts to score a quick win
by sliding pet provisions into a large legislative package sub rosa. Public
notice and comment allows all interested parties, including the public, to
make their opinions known. Agencies must conduct a cost-benefit analy-
sis, and the very real prospect of judicial review helps ensure that they do
a credible job. Additionally, structural mechanisms such as restrictions
on executive branch oversight," 6 as well as independent agency funding,
restrictions on hiring and subsequent employment to counter the "re-
volving door problem," and relationships with other agencies, help insu-
late agencies from capture.'57
Two considerations militate against channeling legislative-type work
to agencies. The first is a concern for preserving democratic values. And,
to be sure, the responsibility for crafting our securities laws should not
belong entirely to the SEC. Indeed, the large questions the next section
will address-about when to force firms into public disclosure-strike me
as a subject ultimately for Congress, not the SEC. But when it comes to
technical, data-driven questions like tinkering with numerical thresholds,
the agency may well be the superior decision-maker, precisely because in
154. 158 CONG. REC. H1241 (daily ed. Mar. 7,2012) (statement of Rep. Steny Hoyer).
155. See Usha Rodrigues, The Price of Corruption, J. L. & POL. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2486720; see generally Samuel Issacharoff, On Po-
litical Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 132 ("But for pursuing direct interests, lobbying is a more
effective means of securing desired ends, and the amounts spent on lobbying rather than on campaign
activities (even in states that permit contributions) reflect corporate understanding that the work of
securing a compliant government is best carried out in the legislative rather than electoral arena.").
156. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 26 (2010) ("[T]he President's ability to remove an agency head only for cause,
which has been the defining feature of an independent agency; freedom from oversight by the Presi-
dent's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs; and a multimember design that is the structural
setup of most agencies with heads removable only for cause.").
157. Id. at 42-58.
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such contexts the electoral accountability of Congress renders it suscep-
tible to interest group exploitation.
C. The Unasked Question: Should We Ever Force Private Companies to
Make Public Filings?
Cynics may find little interest in the saga of Section 12(g). So what,
they might ask, that Congress failed to acknowledge the underlying ques-
tions, or at least to debate them robustly with the benefit of the data
available at the time? This is more a "dog bites man," rather than "man
bites dog" story.
This line of thinking, however, misses one below-the-radar point of
great importance. The point is that the reform effort surrounding Section
12(g) did not focus at all on the broader question of whether we should
impose public disclosure requirements on unwilling private companies.
This question is, however, a pressing one. Congress' consideration of the
JOBS Act, and of Section 12(g) in particular, presented the chance to
consider this fundamental problem of securities law. This episode thus
reflects a lost opportunity to discuss this vital subject. The first part of
this Section will explain why the question is one of urgency, and the sec-
ond will outline four different pathways policymakers might take as they
seek to navigate in the future.
1. The Coming Proliferation of the Large Private Firm
Companies go public for all kinds of reasons: to raise money, to ob-
tain liquidity for founders and investors, and to gain the prestige and
reputational benefits of being a publicly traded company. 8 Yet plenty of
companies resist the siren song of public company status for many years,
growing into multi-billion-dollar private-firm giants. Indeed, the four
largest private companies in the United States-Cargill,'59 Koch
Industries, 1° Mars, Inc.,61 and Bechtel Corporation' 62-are all multi-
158. See Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing and Allocations, 57 J. FIN.
1795,1796-98 (2002).
159. Cargill is the United States' largest privately held company. Top 20 Largest Private Compa-
nies 2012: #1 Cargill, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/pictures/eggh45mfh/1-cargill-3/ (last visited Apr.
20, 2015). Its 2012 revenue of $134 billion would have put it at eleventh on the Fortune 500, in between
Ford Motor Company and Hewlett Packard. Cargill, Incorporated, MARKETLINE, http://store.
marketline.com/Product/cargill incorporated?productid=3704832B-FC30-4430-AA6F-39267548510B
(last visited Apr. 20, 2015); FORTUNE 500, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/2012/ (last visited
Apr. 20, 2015). Founded in 1865, it has remained private throughout its existence. Neil Weinberg &
Brandon Copple, Going Against the Grain, FORBES (Nov. 25, 2002), http://www.forbes.com/
forbes/2002/1125/158.html.
160. America's Largest Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/koch-
industries/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (showing Koch Industries as the second largest private company
in America after Cargill).
161. With revenue in 2012 totaling $33 billion, Mars, Inc. is the third largest privately held com-
pany in the United States. Top 20 Largest Private Companies 2012: #3 Mars, FORBES, http://
www.forbes.com/pictures/eggh45mfh/3-mars-4/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). It has remained private since
its incorporation in 1922. Joel Glenn Brenner, Life on Mars: The Mars Family Saga Has All the Classic
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billion dollar businesses that have remained in private hands since their
founding. Such firms have always been a part of the American corporate
landscape: they generally have stable share ownership concentrated in
the hands of a few shareholders, who are often members of the same
family.
Thus, going public and entering the world of mandatory federal dis-
closure obligation is by no means inevitable. Nor is it uncontroversial.
The scope of our public disclosure regime has been the subject of heated
debate for decades. I63 Much, too, has been written about the costs and
perils of being a public firm.164 In short, this literature shows that going
public creates both direct and indirect costs for firms. 165 Direct costs in-
clude legal and accounting fees incurred in connection with complying
with Exchange Act requirements and SEC proxy regulation.166 Indirect
costs include increased exposure to private and public lawsuits, with at-
tendant increases in directors and officers insurance liability premiums,
and legal fees and management distraction if a suit is filed.167 Being a
public firm is hard.
Moreover, Title II of the JOBS Act relaxed the ban on general so-
licitation, making it easier for private firms to raise money.' 68 Before the
Act took hold, to qualify for an exemption under Rule 506 of Regulation
D, firms could not engage in general advertising when selling their
shares.169 Shares had to be offered to, as well as ultimately purchased by,
Elements, INDEP., July 26, 1992, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/life-on-mars-the-
mars-family-saga-has-all-the-classic-elements-1535722.html.
162. With revenue of $32.9 billion, Bechtel Corporation is the fourth largest privately held com-
pany in the United States. Top 20 Largest Private Companies 2012: #4 Bechtel, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/eggh45mfh/4-bechtel/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). Founded in 1898, it
has been in family hands ever since. Matthew Brunwasser, Steamrolled: A Special Investigation into the
Diplomacy of Doing Business Abroad, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 30, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/
01/30/steamrolled-investigation-bechtel-highway-business-kosovo/.
163. See Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regula-
tion: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. AcCT. AND ECON. 233, 234 (2005) ("[Tlhe economic
consequences of mandatory disclosures are theoretically far from clear and heavily debated." (internal
citation omitted)); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure, A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2000) ("Back in the 1980s, there was an extensive scholarly debate, which pulled
in many leading corporate law academics, but ultimately proved inconclusive."); see generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV.
717 (1984) (outlining an economic-based argument for a mandatory disclosure system in that manda-
tory disclosure will reduce costs); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984) (discussing the interest-group and public
interest explanations of securities regulation).
164. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 16, at 144-53.
165. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV, 409, 435-41
(2008).
166. Id. at 435-36.
167. Id. at 438.
168. SEC, FACT SHEET: ELIMINATING THE PROHIBITION ON GENERAL SOLICITATION AND
GENERAL ADVERTISING IN CERTAIN OFFERINGS (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2013/2013-124-iteml.htm ("By requiring the SEC to remove this general solicitation restriction,
Congress sought to make it easier for a company to find investors and thereby raise capital.").
169. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013).
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accredited investors.17 The JOBS Act, however, directed the SEC to
eliminate this limitation, as long as "all purchasers of the securities"
turned out to be "accredited investors."17' This change in SEC rules
means private companies can now for the first time seek capital by adver-
tising via radio, television, and the internet without fear of breaching the
securities laws.' The ability to reach a wider audience will presumably
lead to quicker, easier and more successful fundraising efforts. As never
before, then, we face the possibility of the proliferation of large firms
that are privately held on the understanding that they could remain so
indefinitely.
2. A Missed Opportunity for a Real Debate
Advocates for raising Section 12(g)'s threshold had a ringer argu-
ment that no one made: namely that the provision was never intended to
force public disclosures on companies that were not being traded. Wawa,
Twitter, and other firms approaching the threshold could argue that,
based upon the concerns of Congress in 1964, the 500-shareholder rule
should not have applied to them at all, since their shares were not being
traded. SecondMarket, however, could not make this argument, since it
by raison d'etre served as a trading platform. The end result was argu-
ment by anecdote, untethered to actual data coupled with facile claims
that, after fifty years, the threshold needed to be "modernized."
The rule established in 1964 captured firms with over 500 share-
holders and total assets exceeding $1 million. The SEC gradually raised
the asset threshold, first to $3 million (1982), then to $5 million (1986),
then to $10 million (1996). Reformers argued that the shareholder
threshold likewise should be increased.' 3 This "let's modernize the
threshold" argument made little sense, however, for a simple reason:
clearly a dollar-value threshold in its nature cries out for modernization
in the form of inflation adjustment, but 500 shareholders today are the
same as 500 shareholders in 1964.
If 500 was too many shareholders to adequately police agency costs,
or to coordinate information demands in 1964, then it might well be an
appropriate threshold today as well. Indeed, given the vast effects of
technology, 500 shareholders are undoubtedly a much more disparate
170. Manning Gilbert Warren, III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen
for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933,33 AM. U.L. REV. 355, 374-78 (1984).
171. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act § 201(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306,
313-14 (2012).
172. SEC, ELIMINATING THE PROHIBITION AGAINST GENERAL SOLICITATION AND GENERAL
ADVERTISING IN RULE 506 AND RULE 144A OFFERINGS: A SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE
(2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/general-solicitation-small-entity-compliance-
guide.htm.
173. Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Serv's., 112th Cong. 25 (2011) (statement of Rep. Steve Stivers, Member, Subcomm. of Capital Mkts.
and Gov't Sponsored Enters.).
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group today than fifty years ago. Or perhaps technology has made coor-
dination and information dispersal easier, so that the number should in
fact be raised. Considerations exist on both sides. Yet no one moved
beyond superficial "modernize the number" rhetoric. Congressman
Himes opined, "the securities laws that were initially established in 1933
and 1934 could evolve and adapt to be more germane to today's mar-
kets.' 1 74 Later Congressman Hoyer referred to registration requirements
that had become "outdated."'75
3. Alternatives
So what should be done about securities law disclosure require-
ments today? The data show that few private firms now find themselves
forced public. Recent legal reforms also suggest that there is a coming
wave of large private firms. I conclude by beginning a conversation about
what to do about this brave new world in which IPOs may be commonly
eschewed, rather than aggressively pursued. I discuss four choices: (1) no
longer impose public disclosure requirements on private firms at all; (2)
condition Section 12(g) on the number of beneficial shareholders, rather
than shareholders of record as we do now; (3) require that firms of a cer-
tain size go public; or (4) impose public disclosure requirements on firms
that are widely traded, using a version of "public float" for privately held
firms-the choice I endorse.
a. Eliminate Forced Public Disclosure
First, we could abandon the field entirely, allowing all firms to de-
cide on their own whether and when they will go public or otherwise as-
sume (commonly by contract) disclosure obligations to other sharehold-
ers and the general public. This approach has the attraction of history.
The last time thorough examination of the matter came was in 1964, as
the then newly-proposed Section 12(g) was considered. 176 As Part I ex-
plained, this provision was intended to bring to heel the many companies
trading over the counter without making the disclosures required of firms
that traded on the national exchanges. Subsequent SEC action has made
this original purpose obsolete, however, because rules independent of
Section 12(g) now impose public disclosure requirements on those firms
that trade over the counter. 77 In short, because Section 12(g) has out-
lived its purpose, a serviceable reform might be to repeal its strictures al-
together.
174. 157 CONG. REC. H7227 (daily ed. Nov. 2,2011) (statement of Rep. Jim Himes).
175. 157 CONG. REC. H7227 (daily ed. Nov. 2,2011) (statement of Rep. Steny Hoyer).
176. Richard M. Phillips & Morgan Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706,716-19 (1964).
177. See, e.g., SEC, MICROCAP STOCK: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS (2013), available at
http://edgar.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm.
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Militating against this deregulatory move is the existence of the
once-robust, if now moribund, secondary trading market of SharesPost,
SecondMarket, and others.78 As previously noted, there are signs of life
in these private secondary markets. On March 5, 2014, SharesPost and
NASDAQ OMX launched a joint venture called the NASDAQ
PrivateMarket, LLC.179 And SecondMarket itself has increased both the
level and volume of its sales in the past year." °
Even if the private secondary markets disappear, there is also evi-
dence that private companies are using private funds to obtain liquidity
and increase beneficial, although not record, ownership. In January 2013,
a Blackrock fund invested $80 million in Twitter. 81 To be more specific,
the capital went not to the company, but rather to liquidate employee
shareholders.182 And that was not the first time Twitter, founded in 2006,
helped its employees obtain liquidity; half of an $800 million investment
in 2011 from DST Global went to employees and investors.183 Pinterest
did something similar, selling $30 million of early investor shares to an
angel fund."84
In other words, SecondMarket may have taken the genie of private
firm liquidity out of the bottle. While firms may have clamped down on
the practice of using that trading platform, as firms' exit horizons stretch
beyond a decade or more, employees and early investors will invariably
agitate for exit, particularly if general solicitation means that large pri-
vate firms do become more viable and more common. As but one exam-
ple, one new startup purports to allow the employees of other companies
to sell the economic rights to their shares without selling the shares
themselves.85 And such trading, although generally among accredited in-
178. See Lee Spears, SecondMarket Acts to Offset Facebook Fees Selling Wine, Art, BLOOMBERG
(May 17, 2012, 10:10 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-17/secondmarket-acts-to-offset-
facebook-fees-selling-wine-correct-.html (discussing SecondMarket's struggle replace its business with
Facebook after Facebook's IPO).
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GLOBENEWSWIRE (Mar. 5, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2014/03/05/6158
56/10071210/en/NASDAQ-Private-Market-Launches-New-Marketpace-for-Private-Companies.html.
180. See Chemova, supra note 76.
181. Douglas MacMillan & Alexis Leondis, Twitter Is Said to Be Worth $9 Billion as BlackRock
Buys Shares, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
01-26/twitter-is-said-to-be-worth-9-billion-as-blackrock-buys-shares ("Twitter Inc. was valued at about
$9 billion after early employees sold $80 million in shares to a fund managed by BlackRock Inc., three
people with knowledge of the matter said.").
182. Id.
183. Id. ("The company allocated half of its $800 million investment from DST for buying shares
back from employees and investors, people said at the time.").
184. Alyson Shontell, Early Pinterest Investors Are Rich, Thanks to SV Angel's $30 Million In-
vestment, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.comla-bunch-of-early-investors-
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lecting examples of investor and employee liquidity from buybacks); Alexia Tsotsis, SV Angel Bought
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angel-invested-30m-in-pinterest-secondary-sale/.
185. William Alden, Start-up Aims to Circumvent Rules on Private Stock Sales, N.Y. TIMES




vestors and thus outside the reach of the SEC's OTC trading rule, none-
theless raises serious questions about investor protection-at least if one
believes, as many scholars do-that accredited investor status does not
equate to sophistication.'
b. Look Through to Beneficial Holders
Second, we could continue to use shareholders as a metric, but look
through to beneficial holders. SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar advocat-
ed this approach. 187 Holders of record is, as other commentators have
pointed out, a flawed metric,"' falling short in two distinct areas. The first
problem is that it is easily gamed, as an episode late in Facebook's life as
a private company illustrated. Pre-IPO Facebook made a widely publi-
cized (and ultimately unsuccessful) effort to evade the reach of the 500-
shareholder rule while still raising capital from a variety of private inves-
tors.89 The scheme involved bundling the interests held by multiple par-
ties together into a single investment vehicle.190 Through the use of this
device, hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals could receive an own-
ership interest in Facebook while Section 12(g) remained inoperative,
because there would still not be 500 shareholders of record.' 91
The second problem with the shareholder record metric is that even
when a firm's shares begin trading on an exchange, these shares are held
in street name. As Langevoort and Thompson make clear, the result is
dysfunctional; record ownership is untethered to real ownership, for all
intents and purposes."9 Indeed, some legislators specifically recognized
and discussed this problem while debating amendments to the JOBS
Act. 1
93
186. See, e.g., Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae
in Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 291 (1994); Warren, supra note 171, at
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191. See id. at 338-39; Liz Rappaport, Aaron Lucchetti & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Goldman Limits
Facebook Offering, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10
001424052748703396604576087941210274036.
192. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 12, at 355 (referring to the "dysfunction" caused by
Section 12(g)'s "size test").
193. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S1767 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (remarks of Sen. Jack Reed)
("Through our hearings on this matter, it is clear that many big firms are getting around this require-
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One episode at the tail end of the JOBS Act's passage suggests that
looking through to beneficial holders might be politically difficult.
Senator Jack Reed introduced an amendment seeking to look through to
beneficial holders. 194 Banks, like Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase &
Co., perceived a threat to their investment business, and they reacted ve-
hemently, inserting themselves for the first time into the JOBS Act de-
bate.95 Thus, powerful repeat players on Capitol Hill might well thwart
any reform effort aimed at regulators keyed at the beneficial holder
level.
c. Use a Simple Size Test
Third, we could abandon the shareholder metric entirely: instead,
lawmakers could endorse a simple size-based test-asset-level, for exam-
ple, or market capitalization. This approach, however, is a flawed one. It
may be true that some portion of securities regulation attempts to create
more accountability for "large, economically powerful business institu-
tions that [are] only loosely coupled with orthodox (and arguably more
measurable) notions of investor protection."'96 Indeed, Professors
Langevoort and Thompson have explained and documented this point.19
But just because securities law to some extent focuses regulatory policy
on larger firms does not mean that it should do so and certainly does not
mean it should do so in pursuing the goals that underlie Section 12(g).
Identifying this accountability aspect of securities law, I argue that it
would be wrong to subject companies who would rather remain private
to the panoply of public company regulations merely because regulators
deem them to be too large or too important to the economy.
The United States has always had large, private companies play a
major role in its public life. 98 In general, when we have regulated them,
we have done so by way of generally applicable laws having to do with
environmental laws, antitrust, labor and employment, duties, and the
like. In short, we have regulated these businesses' business practices. We
have not forced them into the public disclosure regime, nor do I think we
should do so merely because they are large or powerful. Langevoort and
Thompson concede that we cannot and should not prohibit large private
companies as such.19  But forcing these companies to go public to comply
194. Edward Wyatt, Senate Delays Vote on Start-Ups Bill for 2 Amendments, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/business/senate-delays-vote-on-start-ups-bill-for-2-
amendments.html? r=0.
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BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/startup-act-
shows-silicon-valley-clout-growing-in-dc.html. According to Bloomberg, "[1]obbyists and lawyers from
the banks flooded Senate offices with calls and analysis papers, according to two aides with knowledge
of the efforts who spoke on condition of anonymity because the talks were private." Id.
196. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 12, at 340. They cite conflict mineral disclosures as
an example of regulation reflecting political motives rather than strict investor protection. Id. at 367.
197. Id. at 379-83.
198. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
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with size-based disclosure obligations is the same thing as prohibiting
"large private companies" from existing at all.
d. Mandate Public Disclosure for Widely Traded Firms
Finally, we could impose disclosure only on firms whose shares are
in fact traded. John Coffee proposed this solution in testimony before
Congress, stating:
I think we should junk the idea of shareholders of record, which can
be gamed, and turn instead to the concept of public float. Public
float looks at the market value of the securities held by public
shareholders, not employees, not affiliates, but that is the test that
tells us the need for disclosure. And I think if you used a test like
$500 million of public float, that would give you a much better test
that could not be manipulated.2"
Professor Jay Ritter, a well-respected expert on the capital markets, also
endorsed this public-float approach.20 1
The idea of looking at the value of shares that are freely tradable
and trading has great appeal. It circles back to the core idea that gave
rise to the adoption of Section 12(g) in 1964. Moreover, developing a
workable public-float standard would not be hard to do. Lawmakers
could, for example, fix a numerical standard based on the value of a pri-
vate firm's shares no longer held by employees, affiliates, or original in-
vestors, providing that once that number is exceeded, Section 12(g)-like
disclosure obligations apply. This approach would protect firms' ability
to raise capital and use options to hire employees. But if the firm or its
investors began to make serious use of secondary trading options or oth-
erwise obtain liquidity via investors outside the firm, then new duties
would arise. This result makes sense because after a certain amount of
secondary sales, coordination costs increase and agency costs become
harder to police. Moreover, the risks of insider trading become exponen-
tially greater as more trading occurs.
Perhaps, in the end, this "public float" solution will not provide the
right answer to the question of whether the law should force a firm into
the world of public disclosure. But certainly it is a question worth asking.
200. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors.Part I. Hearing
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201. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
No. 4]
1562 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015
